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~:NC-LDC lnvesbnent: A Risk-Benefit Analysis 
WJ1LIAM D. TAYLOR BY (fnioersity of Oklahoma 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a general examination of 
the necessary considerations involved in the multinational corporations' 
(~,,mes) investments in the lesser-developed countries ( LDCs). The 
approach of this analysis has three major thrusts: first, a study of the 
~me decision to invest in the LDC; second, a study of the host LDC 
decision to accept the MNC investment; and third, some concluding 
speculations as to the optimal guidelines for increased future investment 
based on past success experiences . Before proceeding further, it would 
seern appropriate to manifest the fundamental underlying assumption 
of this approach: that is, the assumption that both parties stand to gain 
from carefully selected and executed investment 1-the MNC in terms 
of expanded markets and wealth, the LDC in terms of economic growth 
and societal development. The specific advantages and disadvantages to 
each party will be delineated later in this paper; however, a genera] 
overview of the MNC-LDC phenomenon at this juncture may be helpful 
to the uninitiated. 
The classification of a company as "multinational" involves a defi-
nitional query; unfortunately, the answer is not so obvious as it might 
seem. Generally, for use in this paper, the category of "multinational" 
enterprise will refer to companies which have foreign affiliates or sub-
sidiaries, but which also have a national "home base" from which the 
controlling guidelines and restrictions emanate .2 This element of control, 
or the degree of its exercise, seems to be the distinguishing factor be-
tween the various types of international enterprise. Even this definition 
1 Among the more enlightening sources available on this are, Harry G. Johnson, 
'1'he Multinational Corporation as an Agency of Economic Development: Some Ex-
ploratory Observations," in Ward, Runnals, and D'Anjou, eds., The Widening Gap: 
Development in the 1970's, New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971, pp. 242-52; 
also, External Financing for Latin American Development, published for 0.A .S., 
Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971; Robert Theobald, Profit Potential in the 
Developing Countries, New York: American Management Association Press, 1962; 
also see Leon Weintraub, lnternational Manpower Development, New York: Praeger 
?ublishers, 1969; and Raymond Vernon, "Future of the Multinational Ent erprise," 
m C. P. Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation, Cambridge: The M.1.T. 
Press, 1970, pp. 373-400. 
2 This definition is taken, in part, from Jack Behrman National lnterests and 
the Multinational Enterprise, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. , pp. 1-3. 
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is not wholly satisfactory, for two main reasons : first, the decision as 
where to draw the degree of control line is arbitrary; and second, 0~ 
important aspects, such as ownership, native employment, and po~ 
sovereignty, must be account ed for in a precise definitional schellla. 
Indeed, one author has flatly stated that 
There will be no truly multinational companies until there . 
multinational ownership. And there will be no multinationa l own: 
ship in any real sense until there is some worldwide sharing of 
ownership in the parent company. 3 
The purpose here, though, is not one of definitional elaborati on, b11t 
rather, an analysis of the MNC-LDC relationship. 
The impetus for foreign investment includes both offensive and de. 
fensive reasons, although the latter is more common. A company Will 
naturally desire to one-up or even just keep up with its partic ular CO!ll, 
petitors. Similarly in the defensive realm is the case of a company which 
is "invited" to follow one of its major customers overseas.4 On the other 
hand, offensively, a company may go abroad for unique benefits, as Will 
be shown later; or as in the case of resource-extractive indus tries, a 
company may simply be forced to go beyond the national boundaries 
in order to locate new sources of necessary raw mat erials. There are 
probably elements of both offense and defense in every investment de-
cision, whether domestic or foreign . 
In attempting to place multinational investments in an historical 
perspective, N. H. Leff has identified three main "waves" of MNC in-
vestment . The first wave began prior to World War II, with companies 
investing in overseas natural resources; mining, petroleum, and tropical 
fruit were typical investments. The second wave began in the 1950's 
when companies began to invest in foreign subsidiaries in order to sup-
ply foreign markets near the subsidiary . However, Leff indica tes that 
the tide is turning toward a third wave presently: that of investing in 
foreign subsidiaries in order to supply home markets. 5 This seems some-
what ironic in light of the hue and cry of U.S. manufacturers about 
"foreign imports". In any case, given the profit motive of MNC invest-
ments and the subsequent mitigating risks, it may be fruitful to approach 
the investment from the other perspective, that of the host LD C. 
s Donald Kendall, "Corporate Ownership: The International Dimension," c~ 
lumbia Journal of World Business, vol. IV, no. 4, July-August 1969, p. 60. 
• Vernon, op. cit., :P: 377. 
5 Nathaniel H. Leff, "Investment in the LDC's: The Next Wave ," C]W B, vol 
IV, no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1969, pp. 46-7. 
MNC INVESTMENT 67 
The perceptions of the government and people of an LDC who are 
osidering allowing foreign investment are strangely similar to those of 
:e MNC decision-makers, in that the investment consideration gives 
·se to dissonant thoughts and feelings. On the one hand, the LDC na-
~ves welcome the economic opportunities and advancement which are 
to be created by the investment; this economic uplift is certainly much-
desired and needed. However, on the other hand, the investment possi-
bility arouses deep fears of political, economic, and cultural imperialism; 
the LDC native may have horrifying visions of merciless enslavement 
in a foreign-managed Coca-Cola bottling plant. Indeed, these fears are 
00 t wholly unjustified, as one author has noted: 
Contrary to popular notion, the overwhelming majority of U.S.-
based multinational enterprises-and these are the majority of the 
world's multinational enterprises-are fundamentally U.S. corpora-
tions, managed by U.S. citizens. 6 
Another author is even less subtle in his analysis of U.S. foreign invest-
ments: 
The extent of the U.S. invasion and ruthless acquisition of busi-
ness abroad requires little amplification by overworked statistics. In 
Latin America, U.S. business produces 12% of total output, 1/3 of 
all exports, pays 1/5 of all the continent's taxes .... About 60% of 
Canadian business and industry is U.S. controlled. 7 
Add to this perception of foreign political, cultural, and economic 
pressures the LDC government's fear of aggressive resource-extraction, 
and the consideration of MNC investment is not quite so bright. In fact, 
the fears of and hostility toward Westernization and foreign imperialism 
are so intense in light of the LDCs' colonial histories that a few African 
nations have outlawed the use of DDT, presently their only means of 
preventing malaria. 8 The tragic irony involved in this LDC viewpoint 
cannot be lightly dismissed. 
In sum, the social, economic, and political risks and benefits accru-
ing to each party of the MNC-LDC relationship merit serious consider-
ation prior to an investment action. The focus now turns to a specific 
6 Robert B. Stobaugh, "The Multinational Corporation: Measuring the Conse--
quences," CJWB, vol. VI, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1971, p. 60. 
7 Frank Sheker, "The Multinational Corporation: The New Imperialism?," 
CJWB, vol. V, no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1970, p. 83. 
8 Information provided to the author by Dr. Edward Fei, USAID-Atlanta Con-
ference, Spring 1972. 
68 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
delineation and examination of these risks and benefits and an analysis 
of the points at which negotiation and compromise seem most favorable 
for future investments. 
MNC CONSIDERATIONS 
The first consideration of the potential MNC investor entails little 
risk;9 it involves the analysis of the presently-existing infrastruc ture of 
the LDC. The infrastructure consists of such elements as telecommuni. 
cation, educational system, hydroelectric dams, and a traversab le net. 
work of highways and connecting roads. TI1e development of tllis infra. 
structure must generally be carried out by aid or loans, for investment 
in this sector is only in terms of expected long-range retum. 10 So the 
first assumption for the MNC analyst is the existence of the necessary 
infrastructure for the establishment of a subsidiary; in practical terms 
electricity, transportation, and other facets are prerequisites to industnai 
production. This infrastructural necessity produces frequent region al de-
velopment disparities within the LDC, for the government tends to con. 
centrate its development efforts in only two or three urban centre s, to 
the neglect of the vastly impoverished countryside. 
Another socio-political consideration which may be realisti cally 
called a risk is the possibility of a revolution or coup d'etat in the LDC. 
The LDCs are usually former colonial areas whose new leadershi p and 
governments are frequently less stable than others, producing political 
uph eavals, purges and coups. This political instability often scares away 
new investment, so that the LDC remains unsound. 
A final socio-political risk is the image that the company will have 
if it locates a subsidiary in the LDC; this returns to a point mentioned 
earlier, that of the natives fear of culturnl imperialism. If the company 
establishes an affiliate in a hostile atmosphere, in which the populace 
perceives the company as a threat or as an imposition of a developed 
country's life-style, the chance of damage or ruin to the affiliate is, if not 
certain, at least obvious. 
The economic risks surrounding LDC investments are much greater 
than those of a developed country; therefore, the potential profit yield 
9 Indeed, many considerations of the MNC do not hinge on the LDC risks, but 
rather on the standard managerial and operating systems of the company itself. For 
example, the company must consider such factors as the location of industria l input 
( raw materials, component parts, etc.), market locations, the optimal plant location, 
and so forth. A more complete list of such investm ent considerations is given in 
Appendix A; an examp le of investment factor weighting is given in Appendix B. 
10 See John D. Montgomery , Foreign Aid in International Politics, Engle wood 
CliHs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 60. Also, for a discussion of particular infrastru cture 
projects, see Albert 0. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed, Washingt on: 
The Brookings Institution, 1967. 
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ust also be greater. The single largest obstacle to the MNC-LDC in-
:strnent is the uncertainty surrounding the economy.11 Even with a 
fairly stable political environment in an LDC, the stability and reliability 
of the national currency are frequently dubious; for this reason, many 
MNCs practice a policy of currency-switching to avoid possible losses.12 
lJnfortunately, this practice withholds the possibility that the monetary 
exchanges of the MNC in the LDC might act as a stabilizing agent in 
the economy; however, taken from the investor's viewpoint, the currency 
used by the company must be immediately and consistently reliable. A 
company caught holding large amounts of LDC currency at a time of 
a drastic exchange rate fluctuation is not likely to do so again. Generally, 
given an unstable currency, MNCs are likely to hold only enough na-
tional monies to pay the native laborers; this distrust of the national is, 
again, due in part to a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The most publicized risk of LDC investment is that of governmental 
confiscation; technically, this encompasses both nationalization ( with 
compensation) and expropriation ( without compensation). A fairly typ-
ical business view of this phenomenon is given by F.T. Ostrander. 
In a period of drastic capital shortage, African short-sightedness 
or high-handedness in dealing with foreign private capital can se-
riously handicap its own crucial economic development. It is not 
possible for any nation simultaneously to attract capital and offend 
it.18 
The parent and host country governments, on the other hand, tend to 
perceive responsibility as lying at least partially in the hands of the MNC 
itself. 
In certain circumstances, nationalization without compensation 
will obviously be attractive to the developing countries . . . for it 
will lead to an immediate increase in resources. . . . the apparent 
benefits of nationalization depend chiefly on whether the develop-
ing country believes that private investment is essential or even use-
ful to its development. . . . To some extent, therefore, protection 
against nationalization lies in the hands of the business community 
as a whole. 14 
11 Murray D. Bryce, Policies and Methods fO'T Industrial Development, New 
York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1965, p. 12. 
12 On this point, see "How Multinationals Play It," Business Week, Sept. 25, 
1971, pp. 101-2. 
13 F. Taylor Ostrander, "Africa: A Continent in Search of Development," CJWB, 
vol. IV, no. 4, July-Aug. 1969, p. 50. 
14 Robert Theobald, op. cit., pp. 100-01. 
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Economic guarantees may have the effect of stimulating MNC-LOc 
investment by reducing risk. These economic risk guarantees are usually 
of three types: convertibility, expropriation, and war risk. Three inter. 
national agencies can make certain currency convertibility guaran tees 
for member nations: the World Bank (IBRD), the International Devel. 
opment Association (IDA), and the Inter-American Development Bank 
( IADB). Generally, though, the most comprehensive investment guar. 
antees are from either the parent or host country; the U.S. officially 
extended its investment insurance program to the LDCs in 1952.15 The 
U.S. Agency for International Development, as early as 1960, made guar. 
antees for currency convertibility for thirty-seven underdeveloped coun. 
mes, expropriation guarantees in thirty-four, and war risk guarantee s in 
fifteen of these.16 Many unilateral guarantees of this nature by the parent 
governments are within the framework of the Investment Guar antee 
Program and the Mutual Security Act of 1959, signed by most of the 
developed Western nations. However, such broad, categorical guaran. 
tees do not always suit the needs of the investor, who may have more 
subtle uncertainties preventing his investment. In this case, the host 
government may provide its own guarantees; these are commonly in 
the realms of nationalization guarantees, currency conversion privileges, 
guarantees that foreign technicians may be imported to the company, 
and, particularly, guarantees against adverse changes in tariffs or taxes 
for a specified length of time. Other guarantees may be offered (e .g., 
against competition), but can be less facilitative to one party or the 
other.17 Even the host country guarantees cannot cover all possibilities, 
nor ease all of the worries of the MNC investor, as one author has elo-
quently stated. 
The deterrents ( to private capital) are not only political insta-
bility, but also the decision ... to nationalize oubight or-possi bly 
worse from the investor's viewpoint-to engage in "nibbling nation-
alization" by invading the prerogatives of management in decisions 
concerning hiring and firing practices, costs, and sales, by other in-
terferences with the profit discipline, by limiting dividends, and 
by arbitrarily and unduly increasing the government's "take" from 
existing investors ( even while continuing to extend the beckoning 
15 Charles D. Hyson and Dale R. Weigel, "Investment in the LDC's: The Un-
resolved Debate," CJWB, vol. V, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1970, p. 33. 
16 Ibid., pp. 81.5- Interestingly, South Vietnam was also included in the war 
risks guarantee category. 
17 Bryce, op. cit., p. 260. 
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band of tax advantages and other concessions to prospective new 
investors ) .18 
In essence, this fear of "nibbling nationalization" focuses on two 
rnajor conflicts: first, a clash between the LDCs development plans and 
its ideas about how corporations should behave; and second, a funda-
rnental dispute of national versus corporate sovereignty-a dispute which 
centers on the "extraterritorial exercise of national power." 19 
A final major economic risk is the marketing system of the LDC 
and its surrounding region; if the necessary marketing elements are not 
available, the investment consideration is futile. The MNC may intend 
to concentrate its marketing strategy on local or regional foreign markets 
or on its own home market, but if the means of transporting the product 
to market are unavailable or unreliable, or if the market itself is unreli-
able or stagnant, the potential profit of the operation is nullified.20 Simi-
larly, if the promotion, pricing, or channels of distribution of the product 
are severely limited, either legally or physically, the investment may be 
less than advantageous to the MNC. 21 The main risk consideration for 
the MNC on this point, though, is a projection of the future market 
potential and demands; a company may make a grave error in calculat-
ing, for instance, the future sales of autos in a country that is big only 
in motorcycles at the marketplace. Generally, factors other than market 
projection are fairly stable and are a part of the infrastructural necessity 
mentioned earlier. 22 
There are certain measures which the host LDC government can 
take to benefit and encourage MNC investment, short of the difficult 
development of political stability or infrastructural equality; these meas-
ures are usually the points of negotiation and compromise between the 
two parties. The negotiation is first over the possible measure itself, then 
over the length of time for which the agreement is to be considered valid. 
Tax incentives are probably the most-known and most-used forms of 
financial incentives. Host countries can exempt the company and/ or its 
foreign technicians from taxes for a specified amount of time, until the 
initial high costs of operation have decreased. Puerto Rico was one of 
18 Ostrander, op. cit., P,· 46. 
19 Harry G. Johnson, 'The Multinational Corporation as a Development Agent," 
CJWB, vol. V, no. 3, May-June 1970, p. 28. 
20 Roy Blough, International Business: Environment and Adaptation, New York: 
Mcgraw-Hill, 1966, pp. 34-8. 
21 William A. Dymsza, Multinational Business Strategy, New York: Mcgraw-
Hill, 1972, pp. 108-11. 
22 This stability may cease, though, due to such risks as adverse laws on market-
ing procedure or even drastic climatic changes. 
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the first countries to offer a ten-year 100% tax exemption to foreign in-
dustry, with the exemption percentage decreasing in subsequent years; 
since that time many other countries have followed suit with five and 
ten year exemption plans. 28 Until the 1962 Revenue Act was passed, 
there was an automatic tax incentive for companies to become multi. 
national: foreign affiliates and their holdings were not liable for taxation. 
Now, however, tax liability is based on percentage ownership of equity 
capital, no matter in whose hands. 24 
Tax exemption is often referred to as a "tax holiday" for the investor; 
but so many countries now offer this 'boliday" that it has become almost 
mandatory in order to have an equal chance at attracting foreign capital 
Exemption, though, must be selective in order to be harmonious with 
development plans; one author has compiled a system of optimal eligi. 
bility rules for tax exemption: 
1. Projects must involve manufacturing-processing or assembly-
or tourist facility operation. 
2. In the case of assembly projects, the value added locally by the 
use of local labor and/ or materials must add at least ten per cent 
to the c.i.f. cost of imported parts and materials. 
3. Projects must manufacture products falling within the broad cate-
gories listed. 
4. Projects must involve manufacture of a product not already being 
made in the country in commercial quantities, that is, in quan tities 
sufficient to meet one-quarter or more of apparent local consump tion. 
5. Projects must involve new manufacturing activities, not e1,.-pan-
sions of existing operations. 
6. Investment must amount to $25,000 or more, and projects must 
employ ten workers or more.211 
Import Duty Relief ( IDR) is the second most popular form of tax 
incentive; specific lists of duty-free imports are likely to include neces-
sary industrial equipment, materials, and replacement parts. IDR has 
the important potential of reducing risks and costs for projects which 
are "struggling to reach the breakeven point." 26 M Cs which are export-
oriented may be further encouraged to invest in LDCs by three type s of 
28 Blough, op. cit., p. 223. 
24 Ende! J. Kolde, International Business Enterprise, Englewood Cliffs: Prentic e-
Hall , 1968, p. 388. 
211 Bryce, op. cit., pp. 201-20. 
26 Jbid., pp. 221-3. 
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export tax incentives: free ports or zones; refunds of customs duties, re-
ferred to as "customs drawback"; and by subsidization, perhaps the most 
unique and flexible technique of the three. 
The subsidization of export industries is being accomplished in 
Colombia by an imaginative tax device which could well be adopted 
by other countries. In Colombia, industries operating under a spe-
cial plan for export industries are allowed to assume for tax purposes 
that the profit on export sales is 40% of the export sales revenue. 
This assumed profit is entirely income-tax-free as far as the export 
side of the business is concerned. The law also permits any remain-
ing part of the tax-free assumed profit which has not been used in 
canceling the profits on the export business to be applied against 
the tax which would be applicable on the domestic sales of the 
same company. 27 
For example, a company whose domestic and export sales were equally 
divided, and whose profit rate was 20%, would achieve full exemption 
from income tax. This plan indicates the importance developing coun-
tries place on export industries; the unlimited marketing of a competitive 
export company may lead growth in the economy, instead of following 
it, and the increased foreign exchange is much-desired by the develop-
ing countries. 28 
Another means of financial impetus for LDC investment is that of 
a system of protective tariffs. Three arguments for protective tariffs have 
been advanced: the "infant industry" argument, the "young economy" 
argument, and the "unused resources" argument. The infant industry 
approach seems most applicable where a local manufacturer has access 
to a large market once he has become competitive, so that economies 
of scale are achieved; unfortunately, the stipulation of a large market 
excludes most LDCs. The young economies argument states basically 
that due to the underdeveloped nature of the society and the consequent 
obstacles to industrial development, the LDC government must stimu-
late diverse manufacturing enterprises to give momentum to the economy 
by making a general increase in the level of tariffs. The unused resources 
argument stresses that potential factors of growth in the resource sector, 
such as land, labor, water, etc., can only be of value to the economy if 
they are not idle; here the assumption is made that idle resources are 
"free" resources. 29 
27 Ibid., pp. 224-5. 
2s Ibid., p. 224. 
29 Ibid., m>, 235-38. 
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In general, a modem system of protective tariffs may be bene ficial 
to both parties, but only as a temporary arrangement, 30 if both the MNC 
and LDC are to gain after the critical early years and the initial ind uce. 
ments. 31 
The best-known social incentive of the LDCs is, of course, the large 
supply of cheap labor; this aspect is particularly important to the labor. 
intensive types of industry. 82 The attack on unemployment and under-
employment by the LDCs is a main focus of their modernization efforts.3a 
so hiring of natives is constantly encouraged. Add to this huge source 
of labor the tempting LDC labor cost statistics, and it would seem that 
the most beneficial course for both parties would include a high per-
centage employment of native workers. However, not all industries are 
labor-intensive, nor can any company afford to hire workers who do not 
have sufficient skills or potential for their jobs. So in order to use native 
laborers efficiently, the MNC must embark on training programs for the 
local populace. The cost-benefits analyses of these programs must take 
into account, indeed, reach a sensible balance with the extraordina rily 
high costs of transp orting domestic executives and workers overseas, in-
cluding the "overseas premium payments ." 34 The best policy available 
for this balancing appears to be the initiation of training programs for 
future native professionals, while hiring as many natives as is prac tical 
at the subprofessional supporting and ancillary levels, and tempo rarily 
employing non-native professionals .84a 
A second societal incentive of the LDCs has been referred to and 
implied previously: the marketing possibilities of an LDC and its sur-
rounding region. 811 The particular markets that a company decides to 
so That is, a protective tariff for development should decrease to the normal 
tariff rate as it becomes feasible; this scale of decrements should be specified prior 
to the investment in order to protect both parties. 
31 Blough, op. cit., p. 223. 
82 For a discussion of labor-intensive and capital-intensive investment, see 
S.A. Kuz'min, The Developing Countries: Employment and Capital Investment, New 
York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969, chap. 4. 
33 A penetrating analysis of this point is given by John R. Eriksson, "Empl oy-
ment and Development: The Problem and Some Policy Alternatives," paper pub-
lished by USAID, Oct. 1971. 
34 John G. Shearer, High-Level Manpower in Overseas Subsidiaries, Princet on: 
Industrial Relations Press, 1960, pp. 51-111. Also, see David Young, "Executiv e 
Compensation on a Worldwide Scale," CJWB, vol. V, no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1970, pp. 
69-74; and Virgil Salera, Multinational Business, Boston: Houghton MifHin Co., 
1969, chap. 13. 
34a For further discussion of foreign manpower, see Leon Weintraub, Interna-
tional Manpower Development, op. cit., especially pp. 7-17. A more specific analysis 
of the transfer of personnel skills and management contracts is given by Peter P. 
Gabriel, The International Transfer of Corporate Skills, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1967. 
311 See Madhav P. Kacker, An Exploratory Study of the Marketing Adaptati on 
of U. S. Business Firms Operating in India, unpublished dissertation, Michigan State 
Univ., 1970. 
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concentrate on may necessitate certain product changes, plans for future 
xpansion, or other alternative schemes; but the marketing potential and 
e roduct elements must be calculated prior to the investment, based on 
;uch factors as population growth rate, per capita income growth rate, 
urbanization, GNP growth rate, and so forth, in order to obtain a realistic 
perspective of the likely future of the market. 86 
In sum, the real and potential benefits for MNCs which invest in 
LDCs can provide that extra margin of profit which companies demand 
in accepting greater risks; in proverbial business terms, "there's money 
to be made!" The focus now shifts to an examination of the MNC in-
vestment from the viewpoint of the LDC. 
LDC CONSIDERATIONS 
The lesser-developed countries of the present are, almost without 
exception, former colonies of the developed Western nations; this co-
lonial history undoubtedly influences the LDC's perceptions of foreign 
investment. These perceptions may vary from viewing foreign invest-
ment "with very skeptical eyes," 87 to sensing econoinic plundering, po-
litical domination, and serious handicapping of development. 88 Many 
LDC governments have already experienced the power and influence a 
foreign investor may attempt to exert in national policy-making. 
The social and political risks which the leaders of the LDC perceive 
are not easily understood by the MNC executives, nor perhaps by any 
member of a developed country; the LDC leaders seem to be asking for 
contradictory, if not impossible, alternatives for their societal develop-
ment. On the one hand, their cry is for investment by the developed 
countries, so that the LDC natives Inight rise to at least a Ininimal stand-
ard of living; on the other hand, the demand is for industrialization and 
modernization without the problems Western societies have encountered 
-increased pollution, slums, urban crime, etc. Many Westerners have 
the idea that LDCs essentially want to "have their cake and eat it, too." 
Here, though, is the point at which the developed countries must con-
sider the dilemma of the leaders of the lesser-developed nations. These 
leaders are confronted with an extremely difficult balancing question: 
to what extent shall or can the leaders allow Western influences to be 
admitted to their country and still maintain and promote a distinct 
national culture? Given the preinise that total abandonment of the na-
86 Theobald, op. cit., pp. 47-57. 
37 Stanley D. Metzger, "Private Foreign Investment and International Organ-
izations," in R. N. Gardner and M. F. Milliken, The Global Partnership, New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1968, p. 289. 
88 Aubert 0. Hirschman, "How to Divest in Latin America and Why," in Ward, 
op, cit., p. 253. 
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tional heritage in the name of modernization is not a feasible solution, 
the question becomes one of which elements of the LDC society can be 
wisely traded off for improvements in the development sector. The di. 
verse answers to this question which have been attempted are surely 
indicative that no one answer is always correct. Not only must the 
facets of cultural loss be considered, but also the instability which is 
likely to ensue from these changes. The infamous "revolution of rising 
expectations" has been found to be especially prevalent after such an 
initial uplift in the standard of living.89 This factor of instability may, 
in part, account for the ambivalent approach of the LDC leaders, for 
certainly a leader cannot be effective if he has been overthrown by a 
discontented populace. 
Another element of instability relates to the problems LDC elites 
have encountered in attempting to transform their countries into na. 
tional entities; the simultaneous strivings for economic growth and po. 
litical unification have produced numerous di.fficulties.4° Furthe rmore 
these difficulties exacerbate the previously-mentioned regional dispan: 
ties; not only do the cultural and ethnic differences pose stumbling 
blocks to national development plans, but also the regional infrastruc. 
tural variations make for urban-concentrated industrialization, while 
much of the countryside remains undeveloped. The chaotic rural-u rban 
migration which has come about partly in response to this industria l con-
centration has resulted in staggering urban problems for many LDCs.41 
The so-called "green revolution" has helped somewhat in making the 
urban-industrial and rural-agricultural sectors more interdependent, but 
even here one segment of the population is seemingly doomed to the 
semi-traditional role of supplying food to the more developed urban 
areas, while having little opportunity for savings or life improvement 
with surplus capital. 42 
So, the factors of social and political risk and instability must be 
weighed by the LDC leaders in considering a foreign investment. Sadly, 
the hazards do not end here; the MNC investment also entails economic 
risks for the LDC. 
The major economic risks of an MNC investment fall into two broad 
categories: dangers to the national economy and dangers to the domestic 
populace. The dangers to the national economy center mostly aroun d the 
ao Gabriel A. Almond. and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Devel-
opmental Approach, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966, p. 289. 
40 A.F.K. Organski, Stages of Political Growth, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., 1965. 
41 Joan Nelson, "Urbanization," in Ward, op. cit., p. 144. 
42 V.G. Rastyannikov, "Socio-Economic Aspects of the Green Revolution," In 
Ward, op. cit., pp. 129-33. 
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i,1ready-elaborated currency instability 43 and the effects of the invest-
Jlleot on the balance of payments. An in-depth analysis of the balance-
J,payments phenomenon is not within the purview of this paper; 44 in 
fgct, the difficulty of measuring the effects is a problem in and of itself.45 
~owever, a few generalized statements may reveal the particular risk 
a5pects for the LDCs. Basically, the LDC leaders are faced with the 
problem of greatly increasing their capital inputs while simultaneously 
decreasing their total financial flows. The first part of this problem may 
be resolved by attracting export-oriented industries that can build up 
the national capital holdings; however , if the export ed product is merely 
refined in a developed country , as in the case of extracted resources, and 
resold to the LDCs at developed-country pric es, the outcome of the 
venture may be a minus to the LDC efforts. Or, when the resource 
prices fluctuate and the LDC is forced to borrow, the interest and amor-
1 
tization payments-servicing the debt-further increas e the economic 
dependency of the LDC; the horns of the dilemma become increasingly 
painted in this respect. 46 Even if the MNC is not a resource-extractive 
industry, the LDC prospect may be dim, for there is then a tendency 
for the affihate to return a higher percentage of the earnings to the 
parent company in the developed nation, causing a currency deficit.47 
As one author has put it: 
More serious is the charge that the local company sacrifices its 
own profits to the interests of the parent company or sister com-
panies in an advanced industrial country and that this, rather than 
any lack of altruism, nationalism, or charity, deters local develop-
ment.48 
Therefore, as the LDC attempts to dig itself out of the balance of pay-
ments problems, the direction of the motion may ultimately be down-
ward, unless the necessary controls are apphed to brake the outward 
Hows and stimulate profit reinvestment in the LDC itself. 
The major economic risks to the domestic population are those of 
business exploitation and foreign ownership. The problem of wage ex-
43 See pp. 5-7. 
44 For detailed accounts of the balance of payments , see. Ward , op. cit., chap. 
3; also, Paul Streeten, "Obstacles to Private Foreign Investment," CJWB, vol. V, 
no. 3, May-June 1970, pp. 31-9. 
45 Hyson and Weigel, op. cit., p. 39. 
46 Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1969, p. 149. 
47 A comprehensive study of the factors of profit yield and earnings return is 
given in The Multinational G_01'poration: Studies on U.S. Foreign Investment, vol.I, 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, March 1972. 
48 Streeten, op. cit., pp. 35-6. 
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ploitation is not frequently accented, for almost any wage level represents 
a real increase to the poor natives; also, price-fixing is not usually at. 
tacked by the LDC leaders unless it involves a vital industry, becaUse 
the initial need for non-competition is generally allowed, if not Pre. 
arranged. The main problem, then, is that of foreign ownership of the 
LDC affiliate; unlike the wage and price risks, ownership is frequent} 
a point of hot dispute both prior to and after an investment. If the paren; 
company is allowed to have a majority voice in the operations of the 
LDC subsidiary, the possible outcome is disharmony with development 
plans; on the other side, many MNCs demand this control to counter 
other risks. The response to this problem which became popula r about 
ten years ago was called a "joint venture;" 49 however, the continued 
instability for the MNC even with half ownership in the hands of the 
parent country stockholders and the resulting policy conflicts proved to 
be less than stimulating to further attempts. 
The best approach presently to this problem appears to be a plan 
for gradual transfer to local ownership; 50 but Professor Jack Behnnan 
has criticized these plans for forced divestment as being aversive to 
further investments, emphasizing that: 
Development is more important than who owns the processes 
so long as there is reasonable control by the host society, and so 
long as its members have the opportunity to participate fully in the 
processes and allocation of the results. 51 
The dangers to the LDC from the MNC investment are, indeed, numer-
ous;52 therefore, the benefits involved must also be great enough to sur-
mount these risks. 
One writer, in analyzing LDC benefits, has delineated four major 
advantages that are made possible by the MNC investment: additional 
labor wages, lower prices to consumers, expanded government revenue, 
and external benefits ( e.g., increased training of natives, consumption 
49 Aspects of the joint venture are analyzed by W.G. Friedmann and J.P. Beguin, 
Joint International Business Ventures in Developing Countries, New York: Columbia 
Univ. Press, 1971, especially chap. 1. 
50 Streeten, op. cit., p. 37. Also see C. E. Watson, Staffing Management Positiom 
in U.S.-owned Business Subsidiaries in Brazil, unpublished dissertation, Univ. of 
Illinois, 1970. 
01 Jack N. Behrman, "International Divestment: Panacea or Pitfall?," Looking 
Ahead, vol. 18, no. 9, p. 12. Of course, the absence of this element of reasonable 
control is itself the cause of the divestment attempts. 52 A fairly succinct study of the problems of the investment, as well as the dis-
cordant viewpoints, is given by Raymond Vernon, "Foreign Owned Enterprise ill 
the Developing Countries," Public Policy, vol. XV, 1966, pp. 361-80. 
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f local goods, etc.). Another potential advantage is that of industrial 
0 
urchasing of local-economy materials. 58 To put these advantages into 
p broader perspective, the MNC investment may boost the standard of 
~viJ)g of the natives while it aids the national economy by supplying 
revenue and stabilizing the currency exchange rates. 
Another author states that all potential host countries "have so far 
welcomed it ( the MNC) because they 1ove' the contributions more than 
tbeY 'hate' the interferences." Furthermore, the advantages to the host 
country are seen to lie mostly in the areas of capital formation, tech-
nology and management skills, regional development, competition, and 
balance of payments. 54 These admirable results are not so readily forth-
coming, though, when the same processes are applied to the LDCs as 
to the developed countries. However, it does appear that when the LDC 
governments have exercised their powers to regulate the entry and oper-
ation of MNCs so that development plans are integrated with investment 
plans, the results have been favorable to the growth of the LDC 
societies. 55 
With the possible risks and benefits to each party in mind, the final 
analysis is of the recent trends of mvestment and some particular policies 
and guidelines adopted by the MNCs and LDCs which have shown most 
value to both parties. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It would seem that, in light of the potential benefits to each party 
of the MNC-LDC investment, there would be sufficient motivation to 
have found ways to manipulate the cost-benefit ratio so that the advan-
tages outweighed the risks; as has been said many times in this paper, 
"unfortunately," such has not been the case. In fact, the developed 
countries seem to be less attracted to investing in the developing coun-
tries than was the case ten years ago. As the figures and trends shown in 
Figure 1 indicate, new U. S. investments in developing countries fell 
from 27'1, in 1961 to 2()'l, in 1971 of total new investment activities. In 
part, this disturbing trend has been offset by increased LDC investment 
by other developed countries, as revealed in Table l; France and Ger-
many, in particular, seem to have partially taken up the slack. 
Both the LDC and the MNC appear to be responsible for a 30'1, 
worldwide drop in new U.S. investments in the past ten years; only Japan 
53 Hyson and Weigel. op. cit., pp. 34-5. 
54 Behrman, National Interests, op. cit.,£. 13. 
55 Development Assistance, Switzerlan : OECD, 1968 Review, pp. 106-10. 
Fewer words are said about LDC development benefits than are perha12s called for; 
the subject matter simply seems to preclude concise analysis in this study. 
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and Venezuala recorded increases, as shown in Table 2. The LDCs have 
been more prone to political instability and confiscation 56 than ever be-
fore, and the MNCs have responded with increased control of their new 
foreign subsidiaries, as Figure 2 reveals. 
In view of these downward trends of LDC investment, it seems 
mandatory that if MNC-LDC investment is to be a viable, prosperous 
alternative for the future, new paths and polices must be attempte d to 
counteract the presently trickling flow of private investment in LDCs. 
The final portion of this paper is devoted to some proposals, beyond the 
already-mentioned incentives available which may possibly serve to in-
crease the trickle and stimulate renewed MNC-LDC investment activities. 
The first consideration of both the MNC and the LDC should be 
the areas, sectors, and resource locales for the most profitable labor-
intensive investment. The initial uplift in the LDC economy must attack 
56 Although nationalization and expropriation are, without question , the excep-
tion rather than the rule, the great number of recent coups d'etat in the LDCs has 
produced an investment atmosphere of great unrest. See Victor H. Umbricht, "The 
Main Obstacle is Risk," in International Busines~l970, East Lansing: M.S.U. PresS, 
1970, pp. 245-52. 
TABLE 1. 
(Table V-2.) 
Dae Countries' Private Net Direct Invesbnent in Less-Developed Countries 1956-19711 
Million US Dollars. 
I 1956 I 1957 I 1958 I 1959 I 1960 I 1961 I 1962 I 1963 I 1964 I 1965 I 1966 I 1967 !TOTAL 
TOTAL . . .... . ... . .. -IJ._,_350.jj2,'724.2l l ,970.3 I l,782.3 l l ,969.2 l l ,986.3 I l,527.8 jl,710.0 jl ,909.6j2,711.3l2,320.l l 2,102.2 124,982.7 
United States .... ..... . 1,161.0 1,521.0 765.0 621.0 594.0 828.0 566.0 745.0 869.0 1,295.0 1,074.0 (1,008.0) 11,047.0 
Non-Petroleum ...... . 649.0 546.0 577.0 425.0 498.0 524.0 463.0 660.0 728.0 899.0 860.0 (800 .0) 7,629.0 
Petroleum . . . . . . . . . . . 512.0 975.0 188.0 196.0 96.0 304.0 103.0 85.0 141.0 396.0 214.0 (208.0) 3,418.0 
United Kingdom ....... 363.8 477.6 380.8 456.9 450.0 366.0 213.0 204.0 284.0 439.0 290.0 232.0 4,157.1 
Non-Petroleum .... . .. 245.0 250.0 271.0 316.0 276.0 256.0 188.0 149.0 182.0 266.0 171.0 162.0 2,732.0 
Petroleum and Bilateral 
Portfolio . . . . . . . . . . 118.8 277.6 109.8 140.9 174.0 110.0 25.0 55.0 102.0 173.0 119.0 70.0 1,425.1 
France ......... .. . .... 364.0 399.0 414.0 253.0 379.0 294.0 309.2 280.0 348.8 379.5 339.1 362.2 4,121.8 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . 212.0 120.0 144.0 99.0 151.7 74.6 -12 .2 48.9 49.5 108.6 102.6 56.3 1,155.0 
Germany .. . ........... 54.5 62.6 81.6 129.7 71.7 78.9 92.6 91.4 97.2 124.8 146.3 169.3 1,200.6 
Japan ................. 10.0 14.0 19.0 14.0 77.1 98.4 68.4 76.7 39.3 87.4 97.1 84.6 686.0 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.0 27.0 6.0 64.0 88.9 123.3 154.9 115.2 64.5 77.3 84.9 77.3 889.3 
Belgium ....... ........ 61.0 15.0 76.0 65.0 50.0 20.0 30.0 50.0 50.0 60.0 60.3 10.2 547.5 
Switzerland .......... . . 58.0 30.0 30.0 35.0 46.5 50.0 50.0 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.2 531.1 
Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.0 48.0 33'.0 29.0 28.0 15.5 38.0 33.0 21.9 38.0 33.0 12.0 376.0 
Sweden .............. . 11.4 10.6 15.8 16.7 28.1 35.4 13.0 15.3 24.7 24.5 31.4 25.6 252.5 
Australia ... ........ . .. ... . .. . .. . .. . .. 13.4 13.6 7.2 14.0 48.0 
Denmark .............. 1.6 ... . .. 4.1 4.2 2.2 3.5 3.0 -1.0 1.5 1.0 20.1 
Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. ... 9.3 5.3 1.8 16.4 
Norway ........... . ... 0.3 0.3 2.3 --0.2 .. . . .. 0.4 0.4 1.0 2.7 0.9 1.5 9.6 
Austria ............... --0.2 --0.9 2.8 -4.9 . . . . . . 1.0 0.8 1.0 3.8 0.7 1.0 5.1 
of which: 
Petroleum Investment . 820.0 1,359.0 685.0 748.0 564.0 716.0 323.0 401.0 532.0 907.0 604.0 (700.0) 8,359.0 
Non-Petroleum ....... 1,530.4 1,365.2 1,285.3 1,034.3 1,405.2 1,270.3 1,204.8 1,309.0 1,377.6 1,804.3 1,716.1 (1,402.0) 16,704.1 
1 Including United Kingdom and Italian bilateral portfolio investment, which cannot be separated statistically from direct inv estment ( although rough 
estimates of the breakdown are included in the three-year averages in Table V-1 ), 
Source: O.E.C.D., op. cit. 
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TABLE 2. 
The rapid growth in new foreign activities of U.S. corporati ons during the last ten years has subsided. 
The generally sluggish state of the world economy is clearly reflected in the results of the latest survey of U.S. firms' new 
overseas activities in 1971. The downward trend, which began in 1969, continued. Worldwide, there was a drop of 30% in the 
number of activities initiated . In only two countries were in- creases recorded-Japan and Venezuela. In the United King-
dom, Germany and Canada , recently among the most attractive countries to U.S. investors, there were notable declines. 
U. S. Firm s Overseas-Patterns of Expansion ( 1961-1971) 
(In numb er of activities) (1971 data represent 480 companies) ._ 
1965 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Total 
0 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1966 ~ By Type of Activity 
New Establishments ~ 
Manufacturing 382 445 516 507 426 398 363 371 524 469 311 4,712 0 
'-:I N onmanufacturing ~ Establishments 178 139 202 254 259 190 182 202 348 275 193 2,422 0 Subtotal 560 584 718 761 685 588 545 573 872 744 504 7,134 § 
Expansions 
Manufacturing 185 176 159 155 171 96 54 63 119 90 53 1,321 ~ Nonmanufacturing 70 100 43 13 17 17 6 8 18 12 5 309 
Subtotal 255 276 202 168 188 113 60 71 137 102 58 1,630 en 
Licensing Agreements 340 247 304 282 259 174 139 133 177 129 113 2,297 ~ 
TOTAL 1,155 1,107 1,224 1,211 1,132 875 744 777 1,186 975 675 11,061 ~ 
By Region 
W estern Europe 597 559 597 598 554 473 369 394 595 480 362 5,578 
Europ ean Common Market 332 319 325 334 291 260 204 210 325 284 211 3,095 
Belgium-Luxembourg 38 54 57 61 61 46 35 38 85 63 52 590 
Fr ance 101 64 67 72 54 53 48 29 52 71 57 668 
Italy 63 74 73 63 46 50 37 42 56 27 24 555 
Netherlands 48 42 44 64 45 33 23 41 38 40 25 443 
West Germany 82 85 84 74 85 78 61 60 94 83 53 839 
European Free Trade Assn. 246 209 262 210 170 154 131 148 224 161 119 1,998 
Switzerland 50 34 37 23 12 19 13 17 32 20 11 268 
United Kingdom 166 145 152 156 129 101 101 102 160 109 90 1,411 
Sweden 15 16 11 15 17 17 10 18 16 13 7 155 
Other EFTA 15 14 26 16 12 17 7 11 16 19 11 164 
Other Western Europe 19 31 46 54 93 59 34 36 46 35 32 485 
Western Hemisphere 281 288 325 311 291 227 182 184 266 206 110 2,671 
Canada 88 126 140 130 120 82 72 80 126 93 41 1,098 
Mexico 52 53 71 65 49 49 37 27 47 27 23 500 
Argentia 43 29 20 20 17 16 10 10 22 11 5 203 
Brazil 25 16 10 9 23 10 22 14 16 24 16 185 
Venezuela 18 22 17 9 13 7 7 7 6 7 9 122 
Asia 189 176 206 197 177 112 122 124 217 202 162 1,884 ~ Japan 107 99 123 100 83 54 73 69 127 96 109 1,040 0 
India 28 31 30 33 22 4 6 8 7 9 6 184 ; Africa 31 32 41 44 48 28 29 16 42 27 8 346 
Oceania 57 52 55 61 62 35 42 59 66 60 33 582 .., 
Australia 54 49 53 54 56 34 39 54 63 52 27 535 ~ TOTAL 1,155 1,107 1,224 1,211 1,132 875 744 777 1,186 975 675 11,061 Source: Rhodes, op. cit. 
~ 
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the unemployment and underemployment; 57 also, excepting resouree. 
extractive industries, the greatest profit yield for the M C is in labor. 
intensive investment, particularly for exports .58 A listing of some of the 
most labor-intensive industries in the U.S. is given in Appendix C. 
Also important to both parties is the aspect of ownership; two possj. 
ble improvements are seen at this point. First, the M Cs seem to be less 
hesitant to transfer ownership to national hands when the subsidiary has 
been established for some time; and second, the most auspicious time 
for this changeover, either in part or in fulL may be when the subsidiary 
is expanded in its scope or operation, as the lower half of Tab le 3 indi. 
cates. Another possible avenue for increased investment is that of "sourc. 
ing" in the LDCs, similar to Leff's "third wave." The recent establish. 
ment of satellite companies in LDCs to provide materials to the parent 
companies may signify that this possibility is "no longer a novelty." 50 An 
added attraction to these satellite companies is the greatly red uced risk 
of policy and confiscation interferences . 
A final guideline for potential advantage is that of LDC-c ontrolled 
profit reinvestment by the MNCs. Almost all LDCs have policies designed 
to keep a certain portion of the MNC profits in the national economy by 
specifying the necessary quota of local reinvestment of profits; however, 
the guidelines for this reinvestment, if present at all, have usually not 
been advantageous to either party, often resulting in the risky backing 
of small domestic fiims by the MNCs. What is needed first, prior to the 
questionable development of small domestic firms, is the increase of in-
frastructural capability necessary to allow development at all levels of 
the society. If reinvestment were redirected to the infrastructure, both 
parties would benefit: the MNC would fulfill its reinvestment quota on 
a less risky project with a greater probability of long-run returns; and 
the LDC would be able to develop the sectors and regions of the coun-
try more equitably, so that future investments could be more readily 
attracted. 
Obviously, these changes would not provide a panacea to the numer-
ous conflicts involved in the MNC-LDC investment phenomenon; how-
ever, given the goals and premises of each participant, the possibility of 
improved and heightened attainments in the MNC-LDC relations hip is 
brightened only by the glimmer of hope for future changes in their 
diplomacies. 
57 See Eriksson, op. cit. 
58 Bryce, op. cit., J>P· 57-8. 
59 James Leontiades, "International Sourcing in the LDCs," C]WB, vol. VI, 
no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1971, p. 19. 
FIGURE 2. 
Ownership Patterns of New Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing Establishments 
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TABLE 3. 
The foint venture continues to be less popular than the wholly-owned subsidiary or branch. 85 Shared ownership has not, as some expected, become the pre- management to contend with the problems that arise from a 
£erred form of U.S. direct investment overseas. The relative variety of ownership in the units of a single, multinational 
decline in the establishment of new joint ventures undoubtedly enterprise. The eleven-year trend in new activities demon-
reflects the increasingly complex relationships that exist in mul- strates this tendency. 
tinational business and the general reluctance of investment 
Ownership Patterns of New U. S. Business Activities Abroad 
New Eestablishments (Number) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Wholly U. S. Owned ._ 
Forei~n branch 63 11 34 74 77 45 39 50 88 80 42 0 
Who y owned subsidiary 230 247 349 324 298 285 277 324 437 387 262 i Shared Ownership ~ Majority financial interest 63 61 82 101 74 68 65 73 116 94 71 
Minority financial interest 63 52 62 57 58 36 39 26 62 71 42 ij 
Unknown interest 129 197 177 187 162 137 123 95 148 102 83 
Indeterminable 12 16 14 18 16 17 2 5 21 10 4 ""d 0 
TOTAL 560 584 718 761 685 588 545 573 812 744 504 § 
Expansions (Number) ~ 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 CJ) 
Wholly U. S. Owned ~ Forerv branch 73 115 22 5 5 1 2 2 1 ~ Who y owned subsidiary 141 123 156 137 165 96 49 59 105 69 49 
Shared Ownership 
Majority financial interest 12 6 8 7 6 6 2 6 18 16 5 
Minority financial interes t 10 3 4 4 3 4 4 1 7 9 1 
Unknown interest 11 13 8 8 8 5 3 4 3 6 1 
Indeterminable 8 16 4 7 2 2 1 1 2 1 
TOTAL 255 276 202 168 188 113 60 71 137 102 58 
Source: Rhodes, op. cit. 
Many of the developing countries continue to insist on the faint-venture form of foreign investment. 
The develo~ing countries have the highest incidence of joint is a factor in the relative decline of U.S. investment interest 
ventures. T ey also have the lowest attraction for U.S. inves- should be a question of some importance to the economic plan-
to n. Th e d egree to whi c h th e ir Insist e n ce on th e joint v e ntu re n ers In th ose countrl t.W .
- • 
--~ · 
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APPENDIX A. 
Some Key Environmental Factors 
A. Government, Laws, Regulations, and Policies of Home Country 
( United States as an example) 
87 
1. Monetary and fiscal policies and their effect on price trends, in-
terest rates, economic growth, and stability 
2. Balance of payment policies 
a. Mandatory controls on direct investment 
b. Interest equalization tax and other policies 
3. Commercial policies, especially tariffs, quantitative import restric-
tions, and voluntary import controls 
4. Export controls and other restrictions on trade with Eastern Eu-
ropean and other Communist nations 
5. Tax policies and their impact on overseas business 
6. Antitrust regulations and their administration and their impact 
on international business 
7. Investment guarantees, investment surveys, and other programs 
to encourage private investments in less-developed countries 
8. Export-Import, FCIA, and governmental export expansion pro-
grams 
9. Other changes in governmental policy that affect international 
business 
B. Key Political and Legal Parameters is Foreign Countries and Their 
Projection 
1. Type of political and economic system; political philosophy, na-
tional ideology 
2. Major parties, their philosophy, and their policies 
3. Stability of the government 
a. Changes in political parties 
b. Changes in governments 
4. Assessment of nationalism and its possible impact on political 
environment and legislation 
5. Assessment of political vulnerability 
a. Possibilities of expropriation 
b. Unfavorable and discriminatory national legislation and tax 
laws 
c. Labor laws and problems 
Source: Bryce, op. cit. 
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6. Favorable political aspects 
a. Tax and other concessions to encourage foreign investments 
b. Credit and other guarantees 
7. Differences in legal system and commercial law 
8. Jurisdiction in legal disputes 
9. Antitrust laws and rules of competition 
10. Arbitration clauses and their enforcement 
11. Protection of pat ents, trademarks, brand names, and other indus. 
trial property rights 
C. Key Economic Parameters and Their Projection 
l. Population and its distribution by age groups; population density; 
annual percentage increase; percentage of population of working 
age; agricultural population as a percentage of total; percentage 
of population in urban centers 
2. Level of economic development and industrialization 
3. Gross national product, gross domestic product, or nati onal in-
come in real terms and also on per capita basis in recen t years 
and projections over future planning period 
4. Distribution of personal income, when available 
5. Measures of price stability and inflation. Wholesale price index, 
consumers price index, other price indexes 
6. Supply of labor, wage rates 
7. Balance of payments equilibrium or disequilibrium; level of in-
ternational monetary reserves; and balance of payments policies 
8. Trends in exchange rates; currency stability; evaluation of possi-
bility of depreciation of currency 
9. Tariffs, quantitative restrictions, export controls, border taxes, ex-
change controls, state trading, and other entry barriers to foreign 
trade 
10. Monetary, fiscal, and tax policies 
11. Exchange controls and other restrictions on capital movements, 
repatriation of capital, and remission of earnings 
D. Business System and Structure 
l. Prevailing business philosophy: mixed capitalism, planne d econ-
omy, state socialism 
2. Major types of industry and economic activities 
3. umbers, size, and types of firms, including legal forms of busi-
ness 
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4, Organization (proprietorships, partnerships, limited companies, 
corporations, cooperatives, state enterprises) 
5, Local ownership patterns (public and privately held corpora-
tions, family-owned enterprises) 
6. Domestic and foreign patterns of ownership in major industries 
7. Business managers available: their education, training, experi-
ence, career patterns, attitudes, and reputations 
8. Business associations and chambers of commerce and their influ-
ence in country 
9. Business codes, both formal and informal 
10. Marketing institutions: distributors, agents, wholesalers, retailers, 
advertising agencies, advertising media, marketing research and 
other consultants 
11. Financial and other business institutions: commercial and invest-
ment banks, other .financial institutions, capital markets, money 
markets, foreign exchange dealers, insurance firms, engineering 
companies, etc. 
12. Managerial processes and practices with respect to planning, ad-
ministration, operations, acco~ting, budgeting, control, etc. 
E. Social and Cultural Parameters and Their Projections 
1. Literacy and educational levels 
2. Business, economic, technical, and other specialized education 
available 
3. Language and cultural characteristics 
4. Class structure and mobility 
5. Religious, racial, and national characteristics 
6. Degree of urbanization and rural-urban shifts 
7. Strength of nationalistic sentiment 
8. Rate of social change 
9. Impact of nationalism on social and institutional change 
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APPENDIX B. 
Exampl,e of a Weighted Rating of Investment Climate 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B ----
( 1) (2) (3) (l) (2) (~ Rating Rating 
Assigned of factor Assted of factor 
weights from 0 wei ts from 0 
considering ( completely Weighted considering ( completely Weighllld I importance unfavorable) rating importance unfavorable) ra!ing 
of adverse to 100 (Column l of adverse to 100 ( Col 
Factors listed in develop- ( completely X develop- ( completely ~ l 
order of importance ments favorable) Column2) ments favorable) Col'-'l!Ul 2) I 
1. Possibility of 
expropriation 10 90 900 10 55 550 
2. Possibility of damage 
to property from re-
hellion or war 9 80 720 9 50 450 
3. Remission of earnings 8 70 560 8 50 400 
4. Governmental restric-
tions of foreign business 
compared to domestic-
owned enterprise 8 70 560 8 60 480 
5. Availability of local 
capital at reasonable 
cost 7 50 350 7 90 630 
6. Political stability 7 80 560 7 50 350 
7. Repatriation of capital 7 80 560 7 60 420 
8. Currency stability 6 70 420 6 30 180 
9. Price stability 5 40 200 5 30 150 
10. Taxes on business ( in-
eluding any discrimina-
tory provisions ) 4 80 320 4 90 360 
11. Problems of dealing 
with labor unions 3 70 210 3 80 240 
12. Government investment 90 180 
incentives 2 0 0 2 
TOTAL WEIGHTED RATING OF 4,390 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE 5,360 
Source: Bryce, op. cit. 
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APPENDIX C. 
The 150 Most Labor-Intensive Industries in the United States 
Standard 
industry 
cl,as. rw. 
Industry 
Production 
workers per 
million United 
States dollars 
of product 
2443 
3263 
3262 
2252 
2789 
Veneer and plywood containers ...... . ... . ... . ....... . 
Earthenware food utensils . . ....... . .. . ... . .......... . 
Vitreous china food utensils ..... . ... . . ... .... . . . .... . . 
Seamless hosiery mills ... . ..... . ... . ... . .. . .. . .. . .... . 
Bookbinding and related work ....................... . 
169 
159 
123 
108 
107 
2381 Fabric dress and work gloves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
2327 Separate trousers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 
3151 Leather gloves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 
3987 Lamp shades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
2321 Mens dress shirts and nightwear ... . .................. 98 
3269 Pottery products ( n.e.c. ) t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
3141 Footwear, except rubber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
3251 Brick and structural tile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
2259 Knitting mills ( n.e.c.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
2202 Lace goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
2331 Women's blouses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
2442 Wirebound boxes and crates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
2322 Men's and boys' underwear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
2652 Set-up paperboard boxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
3142 House slippers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
3962 Artificial flowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
2352 Hats and caps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
2361 Children's dresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
2369 Children's outerwear ( n.e.c.) . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. 87 
3259 Structural clay products ( n.e.c.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
2328 Work . clothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
2387 Apparel belts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
2426 Hardwood dimension and flooring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
1922 Ammunition loading . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . 85 
3471 Plating and polishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
2254 Knit underwear mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
3171 Handbags and purses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
3961 Costume jewelry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
2211 Cotton weaving mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
2311 Men's and boys' suits and coats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
2753 Engraving and plate printing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
3172 Small leather goods ... . .......... . .... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
3281 Cut stone and stone products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
2351 Millinery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
2791 Typesetting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
3252 Ceramic wall and floor tile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
3671 Electron tub es, receiving type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
2341 Women's and children's underwear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 
3963 Buttons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 
2335 Women's dresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
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The 150 Most Labor-Intensive Industries in the United States-{Continue d) 
Standard 
industry 
class. no. 
2511 
3851 
2329 
2385 
2441 
3322 
3565 
3992 
3021 
3199 
3264 
2121 
2281 
3496 
3942 
1951 
2339 
2421 
3161 
3995 
Industry 
Production 
workerspe, 
million United 
States doUa,j 
of produci 
Wood furniture, not upholstered ...................... . 
Ophthalmic goods .............. . ... . ......... . .. . .. . 
Men's and boys' clothing (n.e.c.) . .. ..... . ........ . ... . 
Waterproof outer garments .... .. ... . ....... .. .... .. . . 
Nailed wooden boxes and shooks ... .. ................ . 
Malleable iron foundries ............. . ............... . 
Industrial patterns ............... .... ......... . ..... . 
Furs, dressed and dyed ............................. . 
Rubber footwear .............. .. . .. ................ . 
Leather goods ..................... . . ... .. .... ..... . 
Porcelain electrical supplies . . .. .. . . ..... ... .......... . 
Cigars ................. . ..... . .. . .......... . ...... . 
Yam mills, except wool .. ... . .......... .. ........ .. . . 
Collapsible tubes ..... ... .. . . .............. .. . .... . . . 
Dolls ................. . .. . . . ...................... . 
Small arms, 30-mm and under ........................ . 
Women's outerwear (n.e.c.) ........................ .. 
Sawmills and planing mills .......................... . 
Luggage ......... . ..... . ... .. ... . .. ... ............ . 
Umbrellas, parasols, and canes ........ . ........... . .. . 
79 
79 
78 
78 
78 
78 
78 
78 
77 
77 
77 
76 
75 
75 
75 
74 
74 
74 
74 
74 
Source: Bryce, op. cit. 
